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INTRODUCTION
It is a well-established maxim in Britain that Parliament can do no
wrong, although it can do several things that might look somewhat
odd.' The concept of Parliamentary supremacy is deeply rooted in
Britain's cultural and legal tradition.2 Britain exported Parliamentary
democracy to different communities throughout the legal world,
which then made it their rule of law.' The courts' inability to declare
primary legislation null and void became part and parcel not only of
the British legal system, but also of Britain's social culture.4 Britain
has traditionally painted the courts as crippled lawmakers and
1. See Philip A. Hamburger, Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice
Holt's Opinion in City of London v. Wood, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091, 2091 (1994)
(quoting Chief Justice Holt's opinion in London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 687-88,
88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (1702)).
2. See Anthony V. Baker, "So Extraordinary, So Unprecedented an
Authority": A Conceptual Reconsideration of the Singular Doctrine of Judicial
Review, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 729, 735 (2001) (discussing British preference for
Parliamentary supremacy to judicial review). "The power and jurisdiction of
Parliament ... is so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be confined ... within
any bounds..." Id. at n. 31 (quoting Sir William Blackstone's 1899 commentaries
on English law).
3. See Stephen Wright, The Government of Nigeria. in INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT 542, 560-62 (Michael Curtis ed., 4th ed. 1997)
(describing the parliamentary style government created in Nigeria in 1963 in the
wake of British colonial rule). Hirschel notes, "The British government believed
that what was good for Britain was good for its colonies." Id. at 560. QCf Ran
Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial
Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 415, 430 (2000)
(discussing the constitutionalization process in Canada, Israel, New Zealand. and
South Africa).
4. See Michael Curtis, The Government of Great Britain. in INTRODUCTION
TO COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT 33, 48-89 (Michael Curtis ed., 4th ed. 1997)
(explaining the inter-relation between Britain's legal, political, and social
structures inter-relate).
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stressed their function as law-declarersi
The British Human Rights Act 19986 took effect on October 2,
2000. 7 The Act incorporates the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms'
("Convention") into British law.9 Some scholars look upon this
legislation as a key part of Europe's reaction to World War II, which
created a new sensitivity toward human rights and civil liberties.'"
One of the lessons Europe deduced from the period during Nazi
Germany was that European countries must use constitutions and
judicial review to curb the power of European legislators." The
Human Rights Act fundamentally challenges the old British concept
that "Parliament can do no wrong. "12 Scholars have noted that the
Act "unquestionably has the potential for being one of the most
fundamental constitutional enactments since the Bill of Rights,""
and "will significantly affect the operation of traditional
5. See id. at 88 (noting that most British judges construe laws very narrowly
because "it is Parliament, not judicial interpretation, that should change a law that
is unjust.").
6. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
7. See The Human Rights Act-The Rights of Victims of Crime [hereinafter
The Rights of Victims of Crime] (stating that the Human Rights Act of 1998
became law on Oct. 2, 2000), at http://vww.bihr.org/outreach/victin.support.htm.
8. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights].
9. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), at pmbl. ("An Act to give
further effect and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human
Rights...")
10. See James Young, Tire Politics of the Human Rights Act. 26 J. L. &
SOCIETY 27, 27-29 (1999) (postulating that the changed political landscape after
World War I led to a focus on human and civil rights).
11. See id. at 27 (noting that, following World War I1, even some very
conservative English Lords recognized the need for significant constitutional
change to protect human rights).
12. See id. (quoting Lord Jowitt as recognizing the necessity of adopting the
Act, while also stating that he viewed its curbing of Parliament's power as an
"unqualified misfortune").
13. Luke Clements & James Young, Human Rights: Changing the Culture, 26
J. L. & SOCIETY 1, 1 (1999) (examining the constitutional reform brought about by
the Human Rights Act 1998 and its potential for creating a "'human rights
culture").
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constitutional principles"' 4 and British legal culture."5
It is well established that "trust is a salient preoccupation of many
theories of [political] legitimacy."'' 6 Trust also plays a significant role
in democracies.17 This essay argues that in Britain, unlike the United
States, the people neither practice, nor have a prevailing ethos of
distrust for their government. 8 In Britain, people do not possess an
inherent suspicion of the political authorities-Parliament and
Government. 9 In the absence of such an attitude, it is understandable
that there has never been a public outcry for increased judicial
review of primary legislation.20 In comparison with other legal
systems, in Britain a more restrained judicial review of
administrative actions has evolved."' Britain's absence of judicial
power to strike down acts of Parliament, in combination with a
deeply-rooted tradition of Parliament's supremacy and public trust in
it, has opened the gates to a unique model for protecting human
rights. This model, which is anchored in British culture and would
not necessarily function well in other legal systems, does not focus
on the judiciary as a guardian of human rights. 22 Rather, it revolves
14. David Feldman, The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Constitutional
Principles, 19 LEGAL STUD. 165 (1999) (asserting that the impact of the Human
Rights Act 1998 on British constitutional law, although significant, is evolutionary,
not revolutionary).
15. See Murray Hunt, The Human Rights Act and Legal Culture: The Judiciary
and the Legal Profession, 26 J. L. & SOCIETY 86, 87 (1999) (suggesting the
Human Rights Act 1998 will profoundly change legal culture in Britain).
16. BARBARA A. MISZTAL, TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES 245 (1996) (arguing
that trust is the foundation of political legitimacy).
17. See PIOTR SZTOMPKA, TRUST 139 (1999) (exploring the culture of trust in
democracy and autocracy).
18. See infra Part III. (contending that the British citizenry have traditionally
held the government in high regard).
19. See id. (addressing the reasons for the public's general trust in Parliament
and Government).
20. See SZTOMPKA, supra note 17, at 140 ("A democratic polity requires
legitimate criticism based on democratic allegiance; some distrust, in this sense, is
essential for a viable democratic order.").
21. See Curtis, supra note 4, at 89 (stating that English judges arc generally
reluctant to limit the exercise of ministerial administrative power, although a few
judges have asserted jurisdiction in such matters in recent years).
22. See generally Tom Campbell, Human Rights: A Culture of Controversy, 26
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around Parliament and Government's heightened sensitivity to their
traditional roles as the dominant protectors of human rights."
I. THE BRITISH HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: BETWEEN
NOVELTY AND TRADITION
A. BACKGROUND
The British Parliament did not enact the Human Rights Act 1998
as a result of a revolutionary moment. 4 In fact, Parliament adopted
the Act through regular procedure and not by a special constituent
assembly.25 Parliament did not even require a special majority.26 Still,
many regard the Act as a legal and social revolution.27 It constitutes a
J. L. & SOCIETY 6 (1999) (arguing that Government and Parliament play leading
roles in Human Rights protection). Campbell asserts that, "'A culture of rights need
not involve looking principally to courts rather than to representative politics for
solutions to value disagreements and competing interests. In fact, it may require
that courts be seen as essentially protectors rather than definers of rights, providing
remedies on the basis of proven violations of existing positive rights as enunciated
elsewhere." Id. at 25.
23. See id. at 25-26 (concluding that Government and Parliament must address
the protection of human rights).
24. See Spotlight Britain: Human Rights in Britain [hereinafter Human Rights
in Britain] (discussing the procedures by which the Human Rights Act became
law), at http://www.files.fco.gov.uk/info/spotlight/hract.pdf. But cf Bruce
Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 771, 791-94
(1997) (describing the United States' Constitution and the European Union's
Treaty of Rome as two documents that were first adopted through ordinary
federalist procedures but that were ultimately quite revolutionary).
25. See Human Rights in Britain, supra note 24 (discussing the adoption of the
Human Rights Act 1998).
26. See id. (stating that the Human Rights Act came into force after Royal
Assent); see also Parliamentary Director), (explaining that a "special procedure" is
the stage in the parliamentary process when a special Committee elects to conduct
a close, detailed examination of the proposed piece of legislation), at
http://www.britpolitics.com/index.php?cat= 11 &articled= 125. The decision
whether to convene such a committee is subject to the exclusive discretion of the
Parliament. Id.
27. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 203 (1995)
(defining a "social revolution" as a revolution that fundamentally changes class
structure).
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new system for protecting "Convention rights" contained in Section
I of the Act.28 The Convention rights include rights to liberty,'2 9
freedom of expression,30 thought, conscience, religion,3' privacy, 2 as
well as a fair and public hearing in determination of civil rights and
obligations and criminal charges.33 The Human Rights Act follows
Europe's pattern of adopting the European Convention on Human
Rights instead of drafting a new set of constitutional rights.34 The Act
embodies a substantive alteration of the judge's role in British
society, giving the judiciary an extension of judicial powers. First,
the Act directs the courts to interpret laws in a way that is compatible
with the European Convention, if possible.35 Second, the Act
empowers the courts to issue a "declaration of incompatibility" when
domestic primary legislation contradicts Convention rights.16 This
power rejects the classical concept of judicial review, while
formulating a unique, new model of incompatibility.37 A British court
28. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), § I (stating that the
"Convention rights" mean the rights and fundamental freedoms set out in Articles
2-12, 14, et al., of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms).
29. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 5
("Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.").
30. See id. art. 10 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.").
3 1. See id. art. 9 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion...").
32. See id. art. 8 ("Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.").
33. See id. art. 6 ("In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law.").
34. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (listing the rights provided
for in the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights).
35. Set Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), § 2(1) (directing British Courts
.o take into account opinions of the European Court of Human Rights and the
Commission whenever making determinations in connection with Convention
rights).
36. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), § 4 (giving British courts tile
power to declare domestic legislation incompatible with the European Convention
on Human Rights).
37. Compare id. (describing declaration of incompatibility) with WILLIAM B.
I (( .kf RT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-57 (1996) (explaining the origins and
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can, therefore, issue a declaration of incompatibility whenever it
cannot possibly interpret the relevant parliamentary act in a manner
consistent with the Convention. If a higher court issues the
declaration, the court's decision will likely trigger the Parliament to
amend the relevant law.39
Many jurists contend that the new Act has caused an undeniable
shift of power from Parliament to judges.4" Under the Act, British
judges theoretically have the authority, by their declaratory powers,
to affect existing legislation." Yet, the power to issue an
incompatibility declaration differs significantly from the judicial
power to strike down a legislative act altogether, as is the case in the
United States' judicial system.42 Under the unique approach adopted
development of classic judicial review in the United States).
38. See Court Martial Procedures Are Convention Compatible, TIMES
(London), Oct. 8, 2001, at 22 (reporting the July 30, 2001, judgment from Regina
v. Williams). For a discussion of the various problems regarding the interpretation
provision of the Human Rights Act, see Geoffrey Marshall, Interpreting
Interpretation in the Human Rights Bill, 1998 PUB. L. 167 [hereinafter Marshall,
Interpreting Interpretation] (analyzing the meaning of Section 3 of the Human
Rights Act and concluding that it gives brcad authority to the courts in determining
whether legislation is compatible with the European Convention on Human
Rights); Geoffrey Marshall, Two Kinds of Compatibilito: More About Section 3 of
the Human Rights Act 1998, 1999 PUB. L. 377 (analyzing the terms -'read" and
"give effect" in Section 3 of the Human Rights Act and concluding that they do not
substantially change existing rules of statutory interpretation); Francis Bennion,
What Interpretation is "Possible" Under Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act?,
2000 PUB. L. 77 (concluding that Section 3 of the Human Rights Act makes
Parliament's intention a matter of secondary importance in British courts'
interpretation of laws relating to human rights); Richard A. Edwards, Reading
Down Legislation Under the Humnan Rights Act, 20 LEGAL STUD. 353 (2000)
(concluding that Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires British courts to read
down legislation, interpreting it narrowly in a way that is compatible with the
European Convention on Human Rights, not read into legislation remedies that are
already present).
39. See Marshall, Interpreting Interpretation, supra note 38, at 170 (stating that
the effect of a determination of incompatibility should lead to parliamentary
action).
40. See K.D. Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamnentary Democracy, 62
MODERN L. REv. 79 (1999) (noting the shift in power from the executive and
legislature to the judiciary).
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (expressing the likelihood that
such a declaration would encourage Parliament to amend the law in question).
42. See LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 37, at 1-57 (explaining the power of LU.S.
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in Britain, an "unconstitutional" act will remain in force until a
Government minister or Parliament amends it.43 Thus, Parliament has
arguably retained its ultimate sovereignty over the court.44 The
British model is compatible with the continuing centrality of the
British Parliament as the core democratic institution.45 The British
courts, however, still have less power than the courts of other
European democracies, which have endowed their domestic courts
with the authority to annul primary legislation that contradicts
Convention rights.46
B. CURRENT CASE LAW
The events of the first year following the passage of the Human
Rights Act have demonstrated its significance to the British legal
system at large. Even a quick perusal of recent case law suggests that
the court has placed a special focus on due process rights. 7 Article 6
of the Convention, the primary Article assuring due process rights,
guarantees a right to "a fair and public hearing ... by an independent
and impartial tribunal" whenever a determination of civil rights and
obligations is involved.48 For example, in one case a lower court
declared provisions in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990,
which empower government ministers with broad planning authority,
courts to declare legislation unconstitutional).
43. See Ewing, supra note 40, at 91 (explaining that Parliament decided not to
give courts the right to set aside legislation inconsistent with the Human Rights
Act out of a fear that the courts would become unnecessarily engaged in
Parliamentary politics).
44. See id. ("In this context, Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament
is competent to make any law on any matter of its choosing and no court may
question the validity of any Act that it passes.").
45. See Campbell, supra note 22, at 25 (articulating that the Human Rights Act
furthers the political tradition of Parliament as the instrumental democratic
institution).
46. See Ackerman, supra note 24, at 772 (noting that Germany, France, Spain,
Italy, and Hungary inter alia have created constitutional courts since World War
II).
47. See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text (discussing recent case law
addressing Convention rights under the newly enacted Human Rights Act).
48. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 6
(guaranteeing the right to a fair hearing).
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as incompatible with Article 6." This decision leapfrogged the Court
of Appeals straight to the House of Lords." The Law Lords, while
finding the provisions compatible with Article 6, made a conceptual
distinction between judicial or quasi-judicial decisions, which have
to meet the standards embodied in the Article, and ministerial
decisions based on policy considerations, which are beyond the
Article's scope.51 In his concurring opinion, Lord Clyde observed:
The supervisory jurisdiction of the court as it has now developed seems
... adequate to deal with a wide range of complaints which can properly
be seen as directed to the legality of a decision ... But consideration of
the precise scope of the administrative remedies is not necessary for the
purposes of... [issuing a declaration of incompatibility].52
In another case, Article 6 of the Convention paved the way for a
declaration of incompatibility in a case that involved a provision in
the Consumer Credit Act 1974.3 The Consumer Credit Act
provides54 that if a debtor has not signed a document containing all
the prescribed terms of the agreement, the court has no power to
issue an enforcement order.55 The Act, in effect, renders the
agreement unenforceable against the debtor.5 6 As a result, the Court
noted that the Act deprives "the Court of any power to enforce a
regulated agreement. 5 7 This result opened the gates for the Court to
49. See Case 3742/2000, The Queen (on the application of Alconbury Dev.
Ltd.) v. Secretary of State for the Env., Transport. and Regions, 2 All E.R. 929
(Q.B. 2000) (holding that the contested Act was not compatible with Article 6 of
the European Convention on Human Rights).
50. See R. (on the application of Alconbury Dev. Ltd.) v. Secretary of State for
the Env., Transport, and Regions, 2 All E.R. 963 (2001) (stating that Alconbury
applied for judicial review directly to the House of Lords).
51. Id. (discussing the standards of Article 6 as applied to the case of
Alconbury).
52. See id. at 997-98.
53. Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 42 (2001). For interim
judgments in this appeal see Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd., 407 Q.B. (2001).
54. See Consumer Credit Act, 1974, ch. 39. §§ 124-27 (Eng.) (legislating
enforcement orders in infringement cases).
55. See id. (stating the stipulations for a court order of enforcement).
56. See id.
57. Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd., 3 W.L.R. at 47 (discussing the power of
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declare Article 6 of the Convention incompatible with the Act." The
Court stressed that Parliament enacted the Human Rights Act to give
further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the
Convention. 9 The object of the Act is to incorporate those rights into
domestic law, and to give an effective domestic remedy."
In a third case, the Court of Appeals declared a provision of the
Mental Health Act 1983 incompatible with Article 5 of the
Convention, which secures, inter alia, the right to liberty.6' The
Court declared this provision incompatible with Article 5 because it
required patients in mental hospitals to prove that they did not stiffer
from a psychological disorder before they were able to gain their
release from the hospital. 6 The Court fulfilled its duty to interpret
statutes in a manner compatible with the Convention without
straining the "boundaries" of the statutory language. The Court also
focused on a due process question in this judgement.63
The time is not yet ripe for a comprehensive analysis of the impact
of the Human Rights Act on the British cultural environment. Yet, it
seems that a new dialogue of human rights and civil liberties is
developing in Britain.
the court to make an enforcement order under the Consumer Credit Act 1974).
58. See id. at 45 (granting declaration of incompatibility).
59. See id. ("The purpose of the 1998 Act was to give "further effect" to the
[European Convention on Human Rights] and its Protocols by incorporating
existing rights into domestic law and giving an effective domestic remedy, not to
introduce new rights.").
60. See id. (declaring that the purpose of the act was to codify the Convention
rights into domestic law, not to introduce new rights or modify those enunciated in
the Convention).
61. See Term in Act Is Incompatible with Convention, TIMES (London), Apr. 2,
2001, at 25 (reporting the Mar. 28, 2001 judgment from Regina (H) v. Mental
Health Rev. Tribunal).
62. See id. (explaining the Court's rationale that placing the burden of proof on
the mental patient to show his/her sanity prior to release was inconsistent with
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
63. See id. (explaining that the due process issue in this instance was the mental
patient's right to be released from the institution).
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II. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND TRUST FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF OTHER COUNTRIES
A. BACKGROUND
By examining different legal systems, one can deduct that there is
a nexus between constitutionalism and trust. The United States, for
instance, founded constitutional judicial review.' Almost since its
establishment, American democracy has shunned the notion that
"Parliament can do no wrong."65 Judicial review of executive and
legislative actions is an integral part of American culture.6 It stems
from a deep-rooted distrust of authorities-the executive and
legislature alike.67  In fact, public distrust in the American
government has increased over the last few decades." Americans
possess an ethos of profound suspicion whenever a governmental
authority is involved 9 and restraining governmental action is a basic
tenet of American democracy.7 ° Consequently, the American system
of government has developed a highly sophisticated system of
checks and balances.7 The United States Constitution establishes
that, "[T]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the
64. See generally Baker, supra note 2, at 738-53 (detailing how the United
States founded judicial review in eighteenth century and early nineteenth century).
65. See id. at 736 (tracing the roots of U.S.-style judicial review to great British
thinkers Sir Edward Coke and John Locke, who were opposed to total
Parliamentary sovereignty).
66. See generally ROBERT J. BLENDON, ET AL, WHY PEOPLi- DON'T TRUST
GOVERNMENT 205-16 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow & David C. King,
eds., 1997) (discussing the check and balance system present within American
democracy).
67. See id. (examining the attitudes in America towards the government).
68. See SEYMOUR M. LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, TUtE CONFIDENCE GAP
17 (1983) (analyzing Americans' confidence in government from 1958-1984).
69. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing the American
public's general distrust of government).
70. The famous American revolutionary Thomas Paine expressed this notion
most accurately when he said: "That government is best which governs least."
71. See generally LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 37, at 172-220 (explaining how
the U.S. Constitution embodies the concepts of separation of powers and checks
and balances).
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United States of America. 72 The President enjoys broad powers, but
Congress has the ability to hold the President in check in some key
areas of executive power, such as the appointment of ambassadors,
public Ministers and Consuls, and Judges of the Supreme Court.7
Although the President can apply his veto power to annul
congressional legislation, Congress can override the President's veto
with a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress.74 American-style
separation of powers does not aim to enhance efficiency, but rather to
weaken each branch of government's authority.75 Americans view
governmental power as a potential threat to individual liberty, and
perceive absolute power as an all out assault on that liberty.76
The judicial branch's power of constitutional review over both
legislative and executive actions is another expression of the
American preference for limiting governmental powers.7 The
centrality of the role of judicial review derives directly from the
public's suspicion of arbitrary government. 78 The United States has
developed a flourishing system of judicial review over the executive
and legislative branches, which some have referred to as a
"Government by injunction. ' 79 Judicial control of governmental
action in the United States developed without concern for differences
72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. I.
73. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring two-thirds of the Senate to
approve of all presidential appointments of ambassadors and Supreme Court
Justices).
74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (requiring every resolution passed by the
House and Senate to be presented to the President for approval, and permitting the
House and Senate to override a presidential veto and pass the legislation with a
two-thirds majority vote).
75. See generally LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 37, at 172-220 (explaining the
philosophy underlying the checks and balance system).
76. See id.
77. See generally Baker, supra note 2, at 738-53 (discussing the foundation of
the U.S. system of judicial review).
78. See id. at 738-39 (stating that even before the Revolutionary War,
Americans were questioning acts of Parliament).
79. Barry Friedman, The Histoty of the Countermajoritarian Dijficulty. Part
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001) (discussing the
early twentieth century practice by American judges to use the court injunction to
quash labor strikes, a practice referred to by pro-labor activists as "government by
injunction").
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between administrative and legislative functions.' The courts
directed their control equally towards legislative and administrative
bodies, and the Supreme Court became a "national policy maker."'"
B. GERMANY
The effects of the Second World War and the rise of Nazism led to
an era of constitutional judicial review in Europe. 2 It became evident
that European's believed that Parliament can do wrong and that other
entities, mainly the courts, might apply their powers to correct such
wrongs.83 Distrust in the authorities was a central factor in the
German development of constitutional review in post-World War II
Germany.84 Following the enactment of the Constitution (known as
the Basic-Law-the Grundgesetz of May 22nd, 1949),11 judicial
control was viewed as a protector of human rights against the will of
the Legislature and the Government of the day.' The German
80. See generally LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 37, at 172-220 (examining the
history of the American form of government).
81. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as a National Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (asserting that the Supreme
Court of the United States is primarily a political institution and secondarily a legal
institution); see also RONALD G. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149-50
(1977) (debating the merits of the Supreme Court's power of judicial review);
Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Diynamics of Public
Confidence in the Supreme Court, AM. POL. SCIENCE REV. 1209 (1986) (studying
changes in public support of the U.S. Supreme Court over time). Cf JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing for a "representation-reinforcing
theory of democracy," under which courts would review legislation only to assure
that it prevented no one from participating in the democratic political process and
not concern themselves with the substantive merits of choices made by the
legislature).
82. See generally KARLY LOEWENSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR 11 191 (Arnold J. Zurcher, ed.,
1955) (stating that since 1945, fifty nations have enacted new constitutions).
83. See id. at 192-93 (examining the process and the effects of
constitutionalization).
84. See id. (discussing the process of constitutionalization following World
War II in Germany).
85. See BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1995)
(containing official English translation of the Grundgesetz).
86. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 173 (1994) (noting that Germany created a special Constitutional Court
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Framers adapted the American model, including judicial review, into
the Basic-Law.17 A distrust of the legislative and the executive
branches, as well as the regular courts in which judges from the Nazi
period still served, led to the creation of the separate Federal
Constitutional Court.88 This Court enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to
declare laws unconstitutional.89 By establishing this separate court,
Germany distinguished itself from the American model,' ° which
entrusts all courts with the power to declare laws unconstitutional."
C. SOUTH AFRICA
Developments in South Africa during the 1990s also illustrate the
impact of people's distrust upon constitutional law.92 Distrust in
South Africa's judges, who applied apartheid laws, paved the way
for South Africa to establish a separate constitutional court, where
black and white judges serve together.93 Reflecting upon the state of
the judiciary prior to the Court's establishment, one commentator
wrote: "[T]he South African Judiciary has faced ... a determined
government bent upon destroying the rights of most of the people
subject to it .... The Judiciary was in a weak constitutional position
to provide greater protection against government abuses of power than that
provided by the American system).
87. See Jutta Limbach, The Concept of the Supremacy of the Constitution, 64
MODERN L. REv. 1, 3 (2001) (explaining that the Framers of the Basic Law relied
upon the American experience).
88. See id. at 4 (discussing the establishment of the Federal Constitutional
Court).
89. See Gisbert Brinkmann, The West German Federal Constitutional Court:
Political Control Through Judges, 1981 PUB. L. 83 (stating that the Federal
Constitutional Court exclusively interprets the West German Constitution).
90. See generally LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 37, at 1-57 (describing U.S.
system ofjudicial review).
91. See Brinkman, supra note 89, at 83-84 (emphasis added) (noting political
problems associated with giving courts the power to determine the constitutionality
of the law).
92. See generally Puis N. Langa, The Role of the Constitutional Court in the
Enforcement and Protection of Human Rights in South Africa, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1259 (1997) (examining the development and origins of constitutional law in
South Africa).
93. See id. at 1261 (discussing past controversy regarding the South African
judiciary).
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to oppose these trends [prior to the development of the constitutional
court]." 94 Thus, South Africa's history impelled it to grant greater
power to its judicial branch.
D. ISRAEL
Israel also serves as a unique example of the nexus between
constitutionalism and trust.95 For three decades following the
establishment of the Israeli State in 1948, the Israeli public
maintained significant trust in governmental authorities. 6 This
common public sentiment made the Israeli Supreme Court reluctant
to apply judicial review to administrative action. Moreover, the
Court refrained almost entirely from judicial review over acts of
Parliament. Over time, Israelis developed a distrust of the
government, especially with respect to the executive branch. 7
Distrust of the government as a whole, however, paralleled a
growing trust in the judiciary. 9 As a result, the judiciary assumed
more active control over administrative actions." In the process, the
Israeli Supreme Court followed a model of interpretation, similar to a
leading interpretative theory in the United States, which stresses the
importance of protecting civil liberties."°° Such a judicial activism
94. Christopher Forsyth, The South African Judiciar
" 
in Time of Crisis, in TIlE
ROLE OF COURTS IN SOCIETY 25. 33 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1988).
95. See EPHRAIM YUCHTMAN-YA'AR & YOCIlANAN PERES, BETWEEN
CONSENT AND DISSENT 38 (2000) (discussing the degrees of trust given to the five
major political institutions in Israel).
96. See id. at 37-39 (examining Israeli trust in its political institutions).
According to empirical surveys conducted during the 1990s, figures show that
forty percent of the public trusted the Israeli Government fully and thirty percent
trusted it somewhat. Id.
97. See id.
98. See id. In the 1990s, figures show that eighty-five percent of the Israeli
citizenry fully trusted the Supreme Court and ten percent trusted it somewhat. See
YUCHTMAN-YA'AR & PERES, supra note 95, at 37-39. This trust in the judiciary is
compared to forty-one percent who trusted the Parliament fully and thirty percent
who trusted it somewhat. See id.
99. See generally id.
100. See Zeev Segal, A Constitution H'ithout a Constitution: The Israeli
Experience and the Amterican Inpact, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992) (articulating
that the Israeli Supreme Court followed a model of interpretation similar to that of
the United States).
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contributed to a stronger legal orientation of Israeli society, as a
whole, and Israeli politics in particular."0 ' In 1995, an Israeli
Supreme Court decision represented the climax of the trend towards
greater judicial activism.
In a 1995 case, the Israeli Supreme Court recognized the power of
all courts to declare parliamentary acts unconstitutional and invalid if
they violate rights guaranteed by the constitutional Basic Laws.""
Such a judicial announcement-in spite of the absence of any
express constitutional provision granting courts the power of judicial
review over primary legislation-represents a "constitutiona I
revolution."'0 3 Although the Court mentioned the seminal U.S.
Supreme Court case Marbury v. Madison" as a source of inspiration
for its judgment, 05 the Israeli Supreme Court remains hesitant to
declare primary legislation unconstitutional. 106
101. See infra note 103 (discussing an Israeli Supreme Court decision holding
that the Arrangements Law violated the Basic Law).
102. See C.A. 6821 6821/93, United Mizravi Bank Ltd. V. Migdal Cooperative
Village, 49(4) P.D. 222 [hereinafter United Mizrahi Bank Ltd.]. Q. Ariel L.
Bendor, Investigating the Executive Branch in Israel and in the United States:
Politics as Law, the Politics of Law, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 193, 232-34 (2000)
(discussing the interrelation between political and legal issues before Israeli
courts).
103. See Zeev Segal, The Israeli Constitutional Revoltion: The Canadian
Impact in the Midst of a Formative Period, 8 CONST. FORUM 53 (1997) (discussing
the case in depth); Zeev Segal, Parliament in the Era of Judicial Review, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN, ITALIAN, AND ISRAELI LAW 164, 169-78 (Alfredo
M. Rabello & Andrea Zanotti, eds., 2001) [hereinafter Segal, Parliament in the
Era of Judicial Review].
104. 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding that the U.S. Supreme Court had the power to
determine whether laws created by Congress are consistent with the U.S.
Constitution).
105. See United Mizravi Bank Ltd. P.D. 222, supra note 102 (noting the courts'
inspiration from the decision in Marbury v. Madison).
106. See id. Since the 1995 decision in United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal
Cooperative Village, the Israeli Supreme Court has found only three other statutory
provisions unconstitutional. See, e.g., H.C. 1715/97, Association of Investment
Managers In Israel v. Minister of Treasury, 41(4) P.D. 367; H.C. 6055/95, Zernach
v. Minister of Defense, 43(5) P.D. 241; H.C. 1030/99, Oron v. Speaker of' the
Knesset, not yet published (ruled on 3/26/2002); see also Segal, Parliament in the
Era of Judicial Review, supra note 103, at 175-77 (discussing the Association of
Investment Managers and Zemach cases).
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III. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND TRUST: THE
BRITISH PERSPECTIVE
The element of trust should not be overlooked in evaluating
possible developments pursuant to the new British Human Rights
Act. The Act, through its incompatibility clause, clearly establishes
that Parliament is not beyond scrutiny.'07 Yet, while the judiciary
may declare an act of Parliament incompatible with the Convention,
it lacks the power to strike down the offending primary legislationY
To understand this distinctly British model, one must also appreciate
the British people's trust in governmental authorities.
Unlike other countries, British culture does not have a deep-rooted
ethos of distrust in Parliament or in Government. 9 The British
Parliamentary system does not draw a rigid demarcation line
between the two." 0 In contrast, the U.S. governmental system
requires the executive branch to maintain total detachment from the
legislative branch; for example, by precluding a member of Congress
from becoming a judge.' A rigid separation between the executive
and legislative branches of government present within the United
States aims to limit the powers of each." 2 Although Americans may
conclude that separation contributes to safeguarding human rights," 3
such a belief is not found in the British model.
107. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), § 4(2); see also supra notes 35-
63 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's newfound power under the
incompatibility clause).
108. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), § 4(4); see also supra notes 41-
46 and accompanying text (explaining that Parliament retains its ultimate
sovereignty because the judiciary is precluded from nullifying the law altogether).
109. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing the British political
and cultural belief that "Parliament can do no wrong").
110. See generally id. (discussing the public's deeply held trust in the
Government as a whole).
111. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (enunciating the prohibition against the
appointment of Congressional members to positions within the judicial or
executive branches).
112. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for
adopting the American checks and balances system).
113. See The Federalist No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed.,
1961); see generally The Federalist Nos. 9, 73 (Alexander Hamilton), 48-51
(James Madison).
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Hence, whereas the American Constitution provides that all three
branches of government-including the judiciary-are co-equal, the
British judiciary, although it enjoys professional independence, is
subject to the legislature's will." 4 The British courts enjoy discretion
to interpret acts of Parliament, but their power to do so is limited.'" -
With some notable exceptions, the general rule has remained clear
under the Human Rights Act: the plain language of an act "excludes
a consideration of anomalies, i.e., mischievous or absurd
consequences."'1 6 In essence, the law is what Parliament says it is." 7
Indeed, even the Human Rights Act's judicial power to declare acts
of Parliament incompatible with a Convention right is a far stretch
from constituting absolute power over parliamentary actions." 8 The
concept of Parliament's supremacy, which the Human Rights Act has
not abandoned, is more a reflection of deeply engrained cultural
beliefs than it is a legal technicality." 9 In fact, parliamentary
supremacy reflects a great deal about British political, social, and
cultural beliefs. 20 It excludes the idea of judicial review of primary
114. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF TIE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 51-52 (1990) (stating that the special co-equal status of'
the judicial branch, anchored in Article III of the U.S. Constitution, was influenced
by the Framers' belief that there was little to fear from the judicial powers).
Alexander Hamilton once described the judiciary as the "least dangerous branch."
Id.
115. See David Williams, The Courts and Legislation: Anglo-American
Contrasts, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL STUD. 323, 325 (2001) (discussing the courts' role in
interpreting and applying acts of Parliament); Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereigntv in
Comparative Perspective, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16-18 (2001) [hereinafter Lairg,
Sovereignty] (outlining the legal control mechanisms at work in Britain).
116. Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd., 1 WLR 231, 239 (1978) (assessing
when a court is allowed to interpret words used by Parliament).
117. See generally Williams, supra note 115, at 323-33 (addressing the
judiciary's general reluctance to interfere with the decisions of Parliament).
118. See id.; see also Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd., I WLR at 239 (noting
that courts can intervene and save the legislature from being defeated, if it is
shown that there was a drafting mistake by parliament).
119. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Courts, Justice, and Politics in England. in
COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 81, 82 (Herbert Jacob
et al., eds., 1996) (suggesting that Parliamentary supremacy is rooted in the
English concept of politics).
120. See id. 82-100 (reflecting upon British people's deep-seeded notion of
Parliamentary supremacy).
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legislation and, in the past, has also led to a rather restricted judicial
review of administrative actions. 121
The British maxim that "Parliament can do no wrong"
encompasses two separate perceptions.'2 2 First, British people
believe that acts of Parliament cannot constitute an unlawful deed,
since Parliament-like Gilbert and Sullivan's Lord Chancellor-
embodies the law. 23 Second, the British think that Parliament never
intends to deviate from common moral norms. "4 Indeed, the people's
confidence that Parliament is above judicial review, coupled with the
public trust in its common morality, led Parliament to develop a
policy of self-restraint. 25 This parliamentary self-restraint might
therefore diminish the need for judicial review of primary legislation
that is vital to other legal systems.126
Constitutionally and administratively, some jurisdictions look
upon judicial review as less natural than the judiciary's obvious role
in determining criminal and civil liability.'2 7 Judicial review of
indoor Parliamentary proceedings, therefore, is arguably not an
essential part of a democratic system. '1s Different approaches have
developed with regard to judicial review of Parliamentary
121. But see id. at 156 (noting that English courts are increasingly willing to
oversee the actions of government officials when they believe their actions are
improper).
122. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining the origins of the
phrase "Parliament can do no wrong.").
123. See Kritzer, supra note 119, at 82 (emphasizing that Parliament can change
any law it chooses).
124. See Lairg, Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 3 (quoting Chief Justice Coke as
stating that when acts of Parliament are against "common right and reason, or
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and
adjudge such Act to be void"); Hamburger, supra note 1, at 2092-93 (arguing that
Parliament is subject to natural law and intends to follow common moral norms).
125. See Vernon Bogdanor, Britain: The Political Constitution, in
CONSTITUTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 53, 56 (Vernon Bogdanor, ed., 1988)
(noting that although Parliament remains supreme, it is still primarily controlled by
the Government).
126. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing the reliance on
judicial review in the United States).
127. See generally Baker, supra note 2, at 729 (discussing generally the roots of
judicial review and its roles in society).
128. But see id. (considering the perceived benefits of strong judicial review).
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proceedings 2 9 In the United Kingdom, judicial review does not
exist, and its approach that precludes the courts from interfering in
politically tense matters is advantageous in many respects.1'1
Arguably, Britain has no need for judicial review of parliamentary
internal management since Parliament itself serves as a sufficient
substitute.' Such parliamentary self-judging can prevail only when
there is a basic public confidence that Parliament is playing fairly by
the rules of the game. 32
Germany may serve as an example of a different model, one that
has developed in an environment of public distrust in government.,"
Because of this distrust, the German Federal Constitutional Court
exercises wide judicial review that reflects a readiness to intervene in
the day-to-day life of Parliament.'
Even though more intensive judicial control over public bodies has
129. See generally id. (exploring the evolution of judicial review and the
different approaches taken during various historical periods); see also Hamburger,
supra note I, at 2137-47 (analyzing Chief Justice Holt's approach to sovereign
parliamentary power and judicial review); Christina M. Kitterman, The United
Kingdom's Human Rights Act of 1998: Will the Parliament Relinquish its
Sovereignty to Ensure Human Rights Protection in Domestic Courts?, 7 I LSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 583 (2001) (discussing judicial review under the Human Rights
Act).
130. See Williams, supra note 115, at 331 (quoting Lord Irvine's parliamentary
remarks describing the problem of the "basic tension between judicial engagement
in political controversy and public confidence in the judges' political impartiality
in deciding disputes according to the law"). See generally Nixon v. United States,
506 U.S. 224 (1993) (providing an example of the problems created when courts
must deal with political questions).
131. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing Parliament's
adoption of a policy of self-restraint).
132. See supra notes 1-5, 16-20 and accompanying text (discussing Britain's
traditional confidence and trust in Parliament).
133. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text (discussing the German
Framers' belief when drafting the Basic Law that government action should be
kept in check by judicial review). The judicial review established by the Framers
was not universally held by all courts, however. See id. Since many courts were
still controlled by Nazi period judges, the Framers empowered only the nation's
highest court, the Federal Constitutional Court, with the authority of unfettered
judicial review of Parliamentary action. See id.
134. See CURRIE, supra note 86, at 173 (1994) (explaining that Germany has
established an independent judiciary with a Constitutional Court that has broad
powers of judicial review).
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developed in Britain in recent decades,' the basic attitude of self-
restraint has survived due in large part to the judiciary's trust in other
governmental authorities. 3 6 A strong presumption of legality still
plays an important role in shaping the boundaries of the courts'
intervention in governmental affairs.'3
One might argue that the British model of reserved judicial review
reflects the public's limited trust in the judiciary. 3 ' Some scholars
have even argued that British judges, who are drawn from a narrow
social class, are the enemy of any reform.'3 9 Indeed, in the 1990s,
Britain ranked eleventh among fourteen countries examined with
respect to their level of confidence in the judiciary.' In Lord
Diplock's words, "[t]hose who represent the people and have been
elected democratically in a representative Parliament know better
and are better judges of... [the needs of the society] than appointed
judges, who have been appointed not for their social philosophies or
their politics but for their qualification in the law."' 4 ' This principle
135. See, e.g., Inland Revenue Commr's v. National Fed'n of Self-Employed
and Small Bus. Ltd., 1982 App. Cas. 617, 632.
136. See Kritzer, supra note 119, at 176 (stating that English judges are
becoming less reluctant to become involved in government oversight, yet it is
unlikely the courts will involve themselves beyond their current practices of
judicial review).
137. See id. at 81-100 (explaining the rationale underlying the courts' reluctance
to intervene in governmental affairs).
138. See Gareth Jones, Should Judges Be Politicians?: The English Erperience,
57 IND. L.J. 211, 215 (1982) (explaining that English civil servants have never
liked lawyers).
139. See id. at 213 (discussing the limited role of judges in interpreting statutes).
The pre-World War II interpretations of welfare statutes left the Labour Party
distrustful of the judiciary and led it to exclude the courts from judicial review. See
id.
140. Only 3.2 percent held absolute trust in the judiciary, while 16.5 percent
indicated high confidence, and 50.7 percent reported only partial confidence. Israel
ranked first. The United States preceded Britain, enjoying 5.8 percent of public
confidence. Only New Zealand, Poland, and Italy enjoyed a lesser degree of public
confidence in the courts. See INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE PROGRAM (ISSP),
'RELIGION 1991' KOLN, GERMANY: ZENIRALARCHIV FUR EMPIRISCHE SOZIAL
FORSCHUNG, ZA V. STUDY 2150 (May 1993) (cited in GAD BARZILAL, EPHRAIM
YUCHTMAN-YAAR & ZEEV SEGAL, THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT AND TIlE ISRAELI
PUBLIC 55 (1994)).
141. 396 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1978) 1366 (quoting Lord Diplock); see
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reflects Parliament's failed attempt to provide judges with an
enhanced role in shaping policy. Attempts to pass a special
Protection of Privacy Act, vesting the courts with the power to strike
a balance between the right to know and the right to privacy, failed
because the legislators preferred not to give the courts wide
discretion to decide when public interest justified an infringement on
privacy.142
Judicial activism at large arguably requires a conditio-sine-qua-
non, i.e., convincing judges of their authority and responsibility to
rebut governmental decisions without harming their impartial
status.'43 British courts' reluctance to intervene in matters that fall
into the "no-man's land" of law and politics, e.g., issues dealing with
political questions, might be due to their perception of their limited
role in the legal system.
44
also Lloyd of Hampstead, Do We Need a Bill of Rights?, 39 MOD. L. REV. 121,
125 (1976) (contending that judges are ill-equipped to make fundamental policy
decisions).
142. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, 1972, Cmnd. 5012, at 202
(noting the differences between the English judiciary and courts of other countries
where the balancing function is left to the courts).
The vital difference ... between decisions on what is in the public interest.
taken by the courts in countries where a general remedy for invasions of
privacy exists, and the decisions on the public interest taken by English courts
in cases under existing laws which are relevant to the protection of specific
aspects of privacy, is that the judicial function in the latter is much more
circumscribed.
Id.; see also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MArIFRS,
1990, Cm. 1102; INFRINGEMENT OF PRIVACY (CONSULTATION PAPER, LORD
CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, 1993); Lloyd of Hampstead, supra note 14 1, at 125
(suggesting that the background and training of judges tend to make them less
creative and unreceptive to society's needs). It should be noted that the new
Human Rights Act might fill, to a certain extent, the gap in the area of privacy.
Thus, the right to privacy may be introduced into British law, despite the hesitation
exhibited to the proposed enactment of the Privacy Protection Act. See iN.
143. See supra note 130 (explaining the political question doctrine and why
judges have difficulty with such issues).
144. See id.
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IV. GOVERNMENT-PARLIAMENT ORIENTED
MODEL FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
A. A TWOFOLD MODEL
The above analysis of the nexus between constitutionalism and
trust in the United Kingdom sets the stage for a background
understanding of the new judicial role 1is-a-vis primary legislation in
Britain. 45 We contend that the British approach is best summarized
as a Government-Parliament oriented model for protecting human
rights. 46 To fully appreciate this contention, one must remember that
the British Parliament is perceived not only as the deviser of the law,
but also as the protector and nurturer of common moral norms.'47 It is
an unwritten rule in Britain that there are "certain things" that
Parliament will not do, including trampling on basic human rights. '
British constitutional law is unique for its conventions, which are not
deviated from, despite the lack of formal, written rules.' Parliament
and government share the same public trust in their reasonableness
and sense of proportion.5 0
145. See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text (positing that the adoption of
the Human Rights Act was a part of a post-World War 11 European trend of taking
power from legislative bodies and giving it to the courts to protect human rights).
146. See ini-'a notes 147-236 (proposing the Government-Parliament oriented
model for protecting human rights).
147. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (discussing the public's
dual perceptions of Parliament).
148. Lairg also notes that:
It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United Kingdom to do
certain things, meaning that the moral... [or] other reasons against doing
them are so strong that most people would regard it as highly improper if
Parliament did these things. But [i]f Parliament chose to do any of them the
courts could not hold the Act invalid.
See Lairg, Sovereignt,, supra note 115, at 10- 11 (emphasis added).
149. See Williams, supra note 115, at 325 (discussing the lack of a formal
written constitution and the lack of a federal structure); Jason Gundel, Effects of
Judicial Review on Canadian Judicial Culture. 7 Sw. J.L. & TRADE 157 n.2 (2000)
("British legal culture held the supremacy of Parliament in making laws to be its
utmost value. This notion of parliamentary supremacy so saturated Great Britain's
legal culture that no written constitution ever developed.").
150. See generally MISzTAL, supra note 16, at 245-46 (discussing trust as a
primary aspect of legitimacy of Parliament and Government).
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The foundations of the Human Rights Act have been built within
the framework of this cultural background. The Government is
expected to only introduce bills into the Parliament that are
compatible with the letter and the spirit of the Act. 5' Parliament
must show a readiness to pass as legislation only bills that reflect a
commitment to the Convention rights, as adopted in the HILuman
Rights Act.'52 Any breach by Government or Parliament of these
expectations may be classified as "certain things" that Parliament
should not do.' 53
Whenever a court declares, in a final judgment, that an act of
Parliament is incompatible with a Convention right, it is expected
that a Government minister or Parliament will attach heavy weight to
this judicial statement.'54 Refusal by either the executive or
legislative branch to reconsider the legislation involved might be
characterized as a misuse or abuse of authority.15  It is expected that
such conduct would not be tolerated.
Yet, following the British model, a declaration of incompatibility
does not entail a duty to amend the law in accordance with the
court's declaration.'56 Parliament's ultimate authority manifests in its
ability to retain a law deemed by a court as incompatible with the
Human Rights Act.'57 Such an exercise in authority is appropriate,
151. See Lairg, Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 18 (describing the Human Rights
Act of 1998 as giving public authorities the duty of writing legislation that respects
fundamental human rights); Kitterman, supra note 129, at 586-87 (noting that
British courts presume in all circumstances that Parliament acted in conformity
with the Convention).
152. See supra note 28-33 and accompanying text (outlining the Convention
rights).
153. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the public's faith
that Parliament instinctively practices self-restraint when dealing with certain
issues).
154. See Ewing, supra note 40, at 92 (noting that courts would have power to
indirectly strike down legislation because the government would almost always
want to change the law).
155. Cf id. (explaining that even though the government and Parliament may
refuse to take steps to amend incompatible legislation, it has still transferred
significant powers to the judiciary).
156. See id. (stating that it is up to the government to decide how to deal with
the decisions of the courts).
157. See id. (commenting that a decision of incompatibility will not always lead
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however, only when Parliament is convinced that the legislation in
question is, in fact, compatible with the Human Rights Act. 5
Thus, the influence of the Human Rights Act on the day-to-day
agenda of the British Parliament may be far greater than its impact
on the judiciary's role in shaping daily life. Parliament can also
uphold compatibility with the European Convention on Human
Rights by assuring that all legislation it passes is consistent with
Convention rights. 59 The mere fact that the British courts lack the
power to nullify acts of Parliament may actually induce a willingness
among the courts to issue declarations of incompatibility more
frequently. 160
In other countries, such as Israel,' 6' in which courts have the
power to nullify parliamentary acts, the judiciary is notably hesitant
to declare legislative acts unconstitutional. 62 If the British courts do
not sparingly utilize their authority to issue declarations of
incompatibility, the courts may contribute to an even greater
protection of human rights than in other countries. 63 In addition, the
absence of the courts' ability to revoke legislation might spare
Britain the problems relating to separation of powers and
justiciability that have arisen in countries with "full" judicial
to a legislative amendment).
158. See id. (noting that there are examples of legislation that will survive
incompatibility, including provisions dealing with emergencies and constitutional
signals).
159. See Ewing, supra note 40, at 96 (explaining that the Parliament and
ministers themselves must make statements that affirm that bills in either house of
Parliament are compatible with Convention rights); see also Lairg, Sovereignty,
supra note 115, at 18 (noting that legislators have a new duty under the Human
Rights Act to respect fundamental human rights in drafting legislation).
160. See Gundel, supra note 149, at 159-60 (noting that British courts may not
strike down acts of Parliament as unconstitutional).
161. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (discussing the
development ofjudicial review in Israel).
162. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining that despite the
Court's authority to nullify legislation, the Israeli Supreme Court has invoked its
authority on only three occasions).
163. See Ewing, supra note 40, at 99 (explaining that the Human Rights Act
gives significant power to the courts and enables them to formally set the agenda
on human rights questions).
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review. 164
Our proposed model is premised on two assumptions. The first
assumption recognizes the undeniable fact that the enactment of the
Human Rights Act heralds a new era in British constitutionalism.1' 5
The second assumption is that Parliament and Government will
continue as the main players in shaping the boundaries of this new
constitutional age. 166 While the first assumption is almost self-
evident, the second might be found to contradict the common belief
that pursuant to the Human Rights Act, judges will become leading
players in shaping national policies.167
Indeed, the British judiciary is now entrusted with a significant
cultural and legal role.1 68 Britain's impact, however, upon society
will differ to a large extent from the role courts assume in countries
where classical judicial review exists. 169 Judicial declarations of
incompatibility, as provided for under the new Act, may play only a
secondary role in the constitutional process. Still, the British
judiciary, equipped with the power to issue declarations of
incompatibility, may serve as an impartial referee on the
constitutional playing field by warning the main players in the
political arena, i.e., Parliament and Government, of their duty to
consider fundamental constitutional concepts before drafting rules."1
164. See Williams, supra note 115, at 328 (presenting two views of the
connection between judicial review and separation of powers). See generally
Thomas Jefferson, 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 310 (1897) (setting forth
the problem Jefferson saw with the relation of judicial review to separation of
powers and checks and balances in the United States), quoted in LOCKHART ET AL.,
supra note 37.
165. See Ewing, supra note 40, at 99 (noting that the government has retrieved
the first constitutional principle of democratic socialism).
166. See id. (stating that the standard set out by the Human Rights Act allows
for Parliament to retain its sovereignty).
167. But see supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text (discussing the general
belief that the judiciary should not have a voice in questions of policy).
168. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (asserting that the Human
Rights Act extends significant new powers to the judiciary; thus, altering the
British cultural and legal tradition).
169. See Ackerman, supra note 24, at 772 (noting that France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, and Spain, inter alia, have created constitutional courts since
World War II).
170. See Kitterman, supra note 129, at 591-93 (explaining the court's role under
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A post-legislation declaration of incompatibility, accompanied by
detailed legal analysis, may guide a Government minister or
Parliament in adjusting the law to make it consistent with the
European Convention rights.'71
In light of the above analysis, we propose a twofold model. The
first aspect focuses on Parliament and Government, with both bodies
needing to formulate new methods and tools in order to fulfill their
responsibility to act consistently with the Convention rights. The
second aspect of the proposed model centers around the special role
of the judiciary in issuing declarations of incompatibility, as opposed
to systems that give courts the ultimate power to strike down primary
legislation.
B. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT UNDER THE
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
We suggest that the British Government and Parliament bear
primary responsibility to give further effect to rights and freedoms
guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights, as
adopted in the Human Rights Act. This proposition places the elected
bodies, and not the courts, as responsible for enforcing the Human
Rights Act. The legislative and executive branches of government
are both responsible for examining existing and future legislation.
The Government and Parliament cannot execute their roles under the
Human Rights Act by passively waiting for judicial declarations of
incompatibility.
the Human Rights Act and its ability to issue declarations of incompatibility). But
see Michael L. Principe, Albert Venn Dice), and the Principles of the Rule of Law:
Is Justice Blind? A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Great Britain,
22 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 357, 364-65, 595 (2000) (criticizing the
restriction on courts under the Human Rights Act 1998 and suggesting that injured
parties should still take their cases to Strasbourg because of the limited effect of
declarations of incompatibility).
171. See Kitterman, supra note 129, at 592-93 (arguing that the declaration of
incompatibility's purpose is to create public pressure on the government to change
the law); Lairg, Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 19. Lairg states that, "'[Tlhe issue
of a declaration is very likely to prompt the amendment of defective legislation.
This follows because such a declaration is likely to create considerable political
pressure in favor of the rectification of national law and because a litigant who
obtains such a declaration is likely to secure a remedy before the European Court
of Human Rights if a remedy is not forthcoming domestically." Id.
2002]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
This Government-Parliament oriented constitutionalism is based
on the principles of limitation of power, separation of powers, and
the doctrine of responsible, accountable government."' Under this
concept of constitutionalism, judicial review of primary legislation is
not a necessary component of democracy.' 73 The Human Rights Act
supports the well-grounded tenet that protecting human rights can be
advanced and achieved without according the courts the power to
strike down primary legislation.'74
The Government-Parliament oriented model, however, may not be
suited for all legal systems. As described above, judicial review of
statutes has become the flag-bearer of constitutionalism in various
legal systems. 75 In many systems, judicial review is regarded as the
ultimate precondition, if not the only precondition, to the supremacy
of the constitution. 76 In such systems, the power of the judiciary to
interpret and enforce the constitution as the supreme law is viewed as
the most remarkable aspect of the courts' authority. 177
The judicial-review centered model neglects any other possible
means of securing protection of human rights. In Canada, for
172. See HILLAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (3d
ed. 1998) (explaining that the British doctrine of constitutionalism suggests that the
exercise of power should be within the legal limits established by Parliament). The
exercise of this power must conform with individual rights, powers given to
institutions must be dispersed equally among those institutions to avoid abuses of
power, and the government and legislature must be accountable to the electorate.
See id.
173. See id. at 932 (stating that the Convention has a subordinate status to
primary legislation, thus preserving the Parliament's sovereignty and the separation
of powers).
174. See id. at 932-33 (commenting that the government did not intend to allow
courts to strike down primary legislation, but gave them power over secondary
legislation).
175. See id. at 1007 (noting that judicial review ensures that those institutions
with the power to make and enforce laws are kept within the specified confines of
the power conferred).
176. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 43 (1997) (stating
that Marbtuy v. Madison established that courts have the role of settling disputes
over the distribution of power under the Constitution, thus maintaining the
Constitution's supreme authority).
177. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 210 (3d ed.
2000) (explaining that the Constitution is to be considered the supreme law of the
land and it is the duty of the courts to determine the meaning of the law).
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example, the Minister of Justice's responsibility for pre-enactment
scrutiny of proposed federal statutes is insignificant as it entrusts the
Government-the executive branch itself-with the responsibility of
testing its own bills in light of the Charter rights. 7 ' No House of
Commons standing committee is charged with pre-enactment
scrutiny.
179
In contrast, the British Human Rights Act requires a minister of
the Crown to make a statement before Parliament that a proposed bill
is compatible with the European Convention rights.' The minister is
also entitled to declare that although he is unable to make a statement
of compatibility, the government nevertheless wishes the House to
proceed with the bill.'81 It is also of extreme importance that the Act
requires establishment of a Parliamentary Select Committee on
Human Rights to advise both Houses of Parliament (the House of
Commons and the House of Lords) of whether Government
proposals comply with the European Convention. 2 The Select
Committee's authority to scrutinize proposed legislation might
emerge as a vital facet in the development of the new
constitutionalism.'83
Entrusting both Government and Parliament with responsibility
for ensuring compliance with the European Convention rights
178. See Ewing, supra note 40, at 96 (stating that the Minister of Justice must
examine every bill that is introduced to the House of Commons to see if any
provisions are inconsistent with the Bill of Rights).
179. See HOGG, supra note 176, at 952-53 (detailing the Canadian procedure).
180. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). § 19(a).
181. See id. § 19(b) (outlining the provisions of the Human Rights Act). See
generally Ewing, supra note 40, at 96 (discussing the legislative process in
accordance with the Human Rights Act). But see Nicholas Bamforth,
Parliamentaty Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act, 1998 PUB. L. 572, 575-82
(arguing that the provision requiring ministers to make a statement of compatibility
with the Act or state that they are unable to make such a statement, is
unenforceable since no one could have standing to challenge a matter of
parliamentary procedure).
182. See Ewing, supra note 40, at 97 (noting that the committee's function
would be to assist the Government and Parliament in deciding what human rights
actions to take).
183. See id. (commenting that the committee could watch over the protection of
human rights, while also being in the forefront of educating the public about
human rights).
2002]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
secures essential constitutional guarantees. The active procedures of
the Parliament outlined above distinguish the British Government-
Parliament oriented model from legal systems that focus primarily on
judicial review. 8 4 The function of the legislative and the executive
branches in the British constitutional process is of special
significance in that the pre-legislation scrutiny relates to every bill
introduced in Parliament.'85 By way of contrast, in a system
dependent upon judicial review, a law's constitutionality is not
analyzed until a victim brings an application for judicial review. 86
Despite the fact that litigants in Britain have urged the courts to
apply the new Human Rights Act in a variety of matters since it
came into force, judicial proceedings under the Act are, by nature,
rare and relate only to specific violations of a law. 7 Judicial
intervention is expostfacto and usually relates to matters in which a
litigant has already suffered significant harm. 88 The narrow view of
standing adopted by the Act prevents full, comprehensive protection
of the Convention rights. 8 9 This limitation on a litigant's ability to
challenge infringement of Convention rights reflects Parliament's
desire to permit courts to use judicial review only to remedy
individual claims of harm by specific parliamentary acts."" Such a
narrow view of the judicial role differs sharply from the objective
approach that aims to involve the judiciary broadly in protecting the
184. See TRIBE, supra note 177, at 210 (explaining the importance of judicial
review and the court's ability to interpret the Constitution).
185. See Ewing, supra note 40, at 96 (describing the reasons for pre-legislative
scrutiny by the government).
186. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), § 7(3) (outlining the methods of'
applying for judicial review of a case); see also Joanna Miles, Standing Under the
Human Rights Act 1998: Theories of Rights Enforcement and the Nature of Public
Law Adjudication, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 133 (2000) (asserting that for a person to be
considered a victim, the act or measure must violate his or her rights directly or
indirectly).
187. See notes 49-63 and accompanying text (discussing recent case law
interpreting the Human Rights Act).
188. See id.
189. See generally Miles, supra note 186, at 133-34 (describing the
requirements necessary to demonstrate standing under the Act).
190. See S.M. THIO, Locus STANDI AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 2 (1971) (defining
"juridiction de droit subectif' as protecting private individuals by preventing
encroachments on their individual rights).
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rule of law and human rights. 91
The British Government and Parliament can fulfill their primary
duties to protect human rights under the new Human Rights Act only
by systematically reconciling existing primary and secondary
legislation in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Act. 9 2 This
requires what might be termed "genetic monitoring," i.e., an ongoing
process of examining existing legislation in light of the Convention
rights. 93 Such monitoring will ensure that the Convention rights are
taken seriously.
The Government-Parliament oriented model does not allow the
legislative and executive branches to remain idle while human rights
are violated.9 4 Even a mere refusal by a court to issue a declaration
of incompatibility will not necessarily mean that the legislation
involved is compatible with the Convention rights. It might simply
be a case of the court deeming that the applicant lacks a sufficient
interest, or standing, to make a challenge under the Act.' 95 It might
also be that the court is hesitant to issue a declaration of
incompatibility due to its policy of judicial self-restraint in relation to
the legislative branch. 9 6 The courts' judicial approach should not
191. See id. (describing "juridiction de droit objectif" as preserving the law by
conforming the legislative and executive branches of government within their
powers for the interest of the public). See generally TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 361-68 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing
comparative aspects of standing law in the European Community); Michael C.
Jensen et al., Analysis ofAlternative Standing Doctrines, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
205 (1986) (analyzing the American perspective on standing and noting that the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that access to the courts is a citizen's fundamental
right).
192. See Ewing, supra note 40, at 96 (describing the reasons for pre-legislative
scrutiny by the government).
193. See id. at 96-98 (discussing the current system of monitoring and
scrutinizing legislation in light of the Convention rights).
194. See Lairg, Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 19 (stating that, although
Parliament cannot strike down Parliamentary acts, in pragmatic terms, the public
pressure resulting from a declaration of incompatibility will probably lead to
amendment of the legislation).
195. See Miles, supra note 186, at 134 (stating that one has "sufficient interest"
in the illegal act only if he or she is a victim of the act or is likely to be a victim).
196. See Kritzer, supra note 119, at 176 (discussing the reluctance of judges to
get involved in legislative matters).
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discourage either the Government or Parliament from acting on their
authority to amend a law that offends a Convention right.
The primary responsibility of the British Government and
Parliament also enables them to refrain from amending an Act,
despite a judicial declaration of its incompatibility." 7
Notwithstanding the heavy weight of such a declaration and the
possibility of an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg, the legislative and executive authorities preserve the
prerogative of inaction.'98 This policy, adopted by the Act, is not
coincidental; it preserves the tradition of regarding Parliament as
standing at the heart of British constitutionalism.'99
C. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: A
NON-PURE JUDICIAL REVIEW MODEL
The conception of separation of powers as formulated in the
Human Rights Act diverges from the conception that prevails in
systems in which courts are entitled to strike down primary
legislation. The British system, with Parliament retaining the upper
hand, cannot be classified as a system of pure judicial review. °0
Legal systems that adhere to pure judicial review (such as Canada,
Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United States), 20 1 and the British
197. See Ewing, supra note 40, at 92 (stating that the Government can decide
how to deal with the decision of the courts).
198. See id. (explaining that the court can choose not to remedy the
incompatibility).
199. See BARNETT, supra note 172, at 932 (discussing the tradition of
Parliamentary sovereignty); see also Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a
Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 309 (1995) (discussing the constitutional change in Israel after
its independence from the United Kingdom).
200. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (contending that the
judiciary's ability to declare legislation "incompatible" is not the same as
nullifying the legislation altogether).
201. See Erik Holmberg & Nils Stjernquist, Introduction to THE CONSTIrUTiON
OF SWEDEN 27 (Ray Bradfield trans. 1989) (commenting that the question of the
constitutionality of judicial review of was a central feature of the debate in Sweden
in relation to the Basic Law: The Instrument of Government, which is a part of the
Swedish Constitution). Courts may only set aside a law if it is manifestly
unconstitutional. See id.
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system share the common feature of wide judicial discretion in
deciding social, political, and ethical issues.2 2 This wide discretion is
part of the judge's power to strike a balance between conflicting
rights and interests.20 3 Prior to the Act's entry into force, strong
judicial involvement was not totally unfamiliar to the British legal
system; however, since its enactment, it is certainly correct to
suggest that this type of judicial involvement has been reinforced.
This is true despite the fact that the British courts, unlike their
counterparts in pure judicial review systems, lack authority to
unilaterally strike down acts of Parliament.2"
Given the judiciary's power to issue declarations of
incompatibility, the British Government-Parliament oriented model
cannot be classified as completely lacking judicial review. 25 The
Act's specific provision relating to this special declaratory power
constitutes what might be termed a non-pure judicial review model.
This model enables the courts to extend more intensive protection to
human rights.20 6 At the same time, however, the model does not arm
202. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. Supreme
Court as a "national policy maker").
203. See generally Bendor, supra note 102, at 194-98 (noting that in striking the
delicate balance between relevant considerations in constitutional matters, the
courts play a significant role in society at large). The role of law and judges in
politically controversial cases is a source of controversy in may legal systems. Id.
204. See Lairg, Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 17 (noting that British courts
cannot strike down legislation but can use interpretation to bring legislation in line
with fundamental rights); Principe, supra note 170, at 365 (noting that under the
Human Rights Act the courts cannot directly strike down legislation but can issue
declarations of incompatibility); Gundel, supra note 149, at 159-60 (distinguishing
the role of courts in Britain from the role of courts in a pure judicial review
system); Kitterman, supra note 129, at 591-92 (describing the courts role under the
Human Rights Act).
205. See BARNETT, supra note 172, at 932-33 (stating that the courts still have
power to strike down secondary legislation).
206. See Ian Leigh & Laurence Lustgarten, Making Rights Real: The Courts,
Remedies, and the Human Rights Act, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 509, 514 (1999)
(contending that language in the Human Rights Act does not suggest that courts
should grant deference to legislative and government acts); see also Helen
Fenwick, The Right to Protest, the Human Rights Act and the Margin of
Appreciation, 62 MOD. L. REv. 491, 497 (1999) (using the term "margin of
appreciation" to refer to deviations in which the European Convention on Human
Rights allows states to make from the guarantees of Articles 8-11, where such
deviations are "prescribed by law, have a legitimate aim, [are] necessary in a
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judges with what might be described as a "non-conventional"
weapon of striking down acts of Parliament. 07 The model is
premised on limiting judicial responsibility so that judges can only
advise the Government and Parliament to reconsider Acts that are
incompatible with Convention rights.0 8 Despite the weighty force of
such a highly authorized judicial declaration, it is still not binding on
the executive and legislative branches.0 9 Parliament can refuse the
court's recommendation to strike down primary legislation, as
embodied in a declaration of incompatibility.210 Thus, the Human
Rights Act, with its non-pure judicial review characteristics, allows
Britain to edge cautiously forward into the age of constitutionalism,
without introducing chaos into the system by demolishing its
tradition of trusting Parliament.1
This unique constitutional framework of non-pure judicial review
might encourage the courts, in the future, to take a more active role
in Britain's new constitutional age. The limited power granted to
the British courts might encourage them to overcome the natural
reluctance to exert judicial power over primary legislation. 21 1
democratic society and ... [are] applied in a non-discriminatory fashion"). The
European Convention on Human Rights, unlike the British Human Rights Act,
accords this "margin of appreciation" to many basic political rights guaranteed by
Articles 8-11, such as freedom of expression and the right to protest. See European
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8, arts. 8-11.
207. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (explaining that the
judiciary's ability to declare legislation "incompatible" is a limited power).
208. See Fenwick, supra note 206, at 505 (noting that even though a court might
find the legislation incompatible with the Act, it must still apply the legislation and
hope that it is later amended by Parliament).
209. See id. (discussing the courts' authority under the Human Rights Act).
210. See id.; see also supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing the
judiciary's ability to declare legislation "incompatible").
211. See Williams, supra note 115, at 328 (noting that the Human Rights Act
represents a significant step toward constitutional adjudication); Kitterman, supra
note 129, at 586-95 (discussing the U.K.'s traditional legal framework and the
effect of the introduction of the Human Rights Act).
212. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (asserting that the courts may
actually be more willing to invoke their authority because Parliament remains the
ultimate decision-maker regarding the fate of the legislation in question).
213. See also supra note 162 and accompanying text (comparing the general
reluctance of courts in countries that utilize pure judicial review to countries with
the ability to nullify acts of the legislature).
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Ironically, such reluctance is a prevalent characteristic of some pure
judicial review systems, especially at the beginning of a judicial
review era. 14
In a pure judicial review system, judicial power to declare acts of
the legislature unconstitutional, with the effect of striking them
down, might clash with basic elements of democracy and rules
derived from the rule of law. Vesting courts with the power to annul
primary legislation raises a counter-majoritarian dilemma, namely,
the issue of allowing non-elected judges to act contrary to the will of
the majority, as reflected by the elected Parliament. -5 The counter-
majoritarian difficulty is sharpened by the gray area of typical
constitutional choices, in which there is a need for striking a delicate
balance between conflicting rights and interests. - 6 Such choices
might be subjective in nature and influenced by the judge's personal
convictions, especially in difficult cases. '7 This subjectivity
emphasizes the possible disadvantage of vesting judges with an
ultimate power to set aside the will of the majority's
representatives.18
214. See supra notes 95-106 and accompanying text (providing the situation in
Israel as an example).
215. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: TIlE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 17 (1962) (noting that the difficulty with judicial
review is that elected officials must delegate some of their constitutionally
assigned tasks to judges who are not elected, thus, they are not directly accountable
to the people); see also Friedman, supra note 79, at 34749 (commenting that when
the people, in general, agree with the court's decision, there is less
countermajoritarian criticism and the will of the people is not as highly regarded);
MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN COURTS 16 (1994) (arguing that when the
Supreme Court declares a legislative act unconstitutional, it interferes with the will
of the people and works against the prevailing majority).
216. See Vincent P. Pace, Partial Entrenchment of a Bill of Rights: The
Canadian Model Offers a Viable Solution to the United Kingdom "s Bill of Rights
Debate, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149, 184-85 (1998) ("Cases involving conflicts
between rights may afford judges even greater discretion because outcomes in
these cases often turn solely upon policy considerations.")
217. See id. (discussing how a judge's personal convictions may unduly
influence outcomes, especially in cases where there is a conflict between rights).
218. See PERRY, supra note 215, at 15-30 (addressing the difficulties
encountered when courts are given the power to act against the supposed will of
the people).
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The Government-Parliament oriented model circumvents the
counter-majoritarian dilemma by retaining the concept of
Parliament's supremacy.1 9 In addition, the role of the judiciary is
respected-judicial declarations of incompatibility enjoy a special
status. 220 While neither Government nor Parliament can simply
overlook such declarations, and are likely to amend the law involved
accordingly, the will of the majority still prevails. 22' Government and
Parliament are entitled to let an offending statute remain in force,
while risking that the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg
will rule against them.222
The Government-Parliament oriented model also offers a solution
to any possible outcry naturally following a judicial decision to set
aside an act of Parliament. 223 Such a decision by the judiciary,
especially when it involves a law deeply rooted in the legal system,
could meet with extensive public criticism. Since the courts lack the
authority to nullify an act of Parliament, such an outcry probably will
never occur in Britain. Furthermore, granting the judicial branch the
ultimate power to declare statutes void in a mature democracy might
cause much greater difficulties than introducing such a principal in a
state's formative period.224 This argument might also justify the
219. See BARNETT, supra note 172, at 932 (stating that courts are not allowed to
strike down primary legislation, thus preserving the supremacy of Parliament).
220. See generally supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing the
judiciary's role under the Human Rights Act).
221. See Kitterman, supra note 129, at 591-93 ("The purpose of a declaration of
incompatibility is to create public interest and put pressure on the government to
change such law."); Lairg, Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 19 (noting that
declarations of incompatibility have the ability to create public pressure to change
the law).
222. See generally HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 10
(1996) (commenting that according to the "margin of appreciation" doctrine, with
respect to many matters, the Convention leaves the Contracting Parties an area of
discretion, in which the European Court will not intervene); J.G. MERRILLS, TIlE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 151 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that though Contracting Parties retain discretion,
this area is very difficult to adjudicate).
223. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing why courts should
always avoid entanglement in political questions).
224. See also supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons for
the Israeli Supreme Court's apparent reluctance to declare legislative acts
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British special model of non-pure judicial review in a constitutional
judicial review world.
It should be noted that the more recently constructed democratic
governments, which have adopted constitutions permitting judicial
review, have modified their judicial systems in order to avoid the
complexities that arise from the impact of judicial decisions that set
aside existing laws.25 For example, the Canadian Supreme Court has
ruled that courts may suspend the implementation of a decision to
strike down a legislative provision until Parliament has had the
opportunity to amend it if annulling the provision poses a threat to
the rule of law. 6 In such cases, the Canadian Supreme Court stays
its decision for a period long enough to allow Parliament to address
the difficult issue of amending the law to meet the constitutional
requirements.27 Israel has adopted a similar approach when the court
decides to declare a law unconstitutional. 2 In Italy, the
Constitutional Court has developed a policy of suspending, in
exceptional cases, the publication of its forthcoming decisions, in
order to give the legislature time to amend the law. "9
Such special procedural mechanisms have narrowed the gap
between pure and non-pure judicial review systems. In both systems,
it is possible for offending primary legislation to remain in effect
until Parliament addresses the matter.2 30 Nevertheless, a difference
still exists. In a pure judicial review system, a judicial declaration of
nullity comes into effect in the event that the legislature refrains from
unconstitutional).
225. See generally Gundel, supra note 149 (discussing the adoption of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada in 1982 with its system of judicial
review and the effect that it has had on the Canadian legal system).
226. See Schachter v. Canada [1992] 93 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 21 (discussing when a
court can decide to suspend the declaration of invalidity).
227. See R. v. Swain [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933.
228. See supra notes 95-106 and accompanying text (discussing the process of
judicial review in Israel).
229. See generally Alessandro Pizzorusso et al, The Constitutional Review of
Legislation in Italy, 56 TEM. L.Q. 503, 515 (1983) (noting the importance of
supporting the legislature).
230. See Kitterman, supra note 129, at 592-93 ("Even following a declaration of
incompatibility, the government is not bound to act either by way of primary or
subordinate legislation.")
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acting.23 ' In contrast, under the new British non-pure judicial review
system, a judicial declaration of incompatibility could be no more
than a voice lost in the wilderness. 32 However, one might reasonably
assume that the echo of the judicial voice would be strong enough to
bring about a change in the law.233
We may have reached a paradoxical situation in which the courts'
weakness in a non-pure judicial system may be a source of judicial
activism. The fact that a court decision does not have the effect of
striking down a law might encourage judges to exercise their limited
powers to the fullest in interpreting existing laws in accordance with
the liberal view drawn by the Human Rights Act. 234 It also might
help to develop a legal culture at large more compatible with the
spirit of human rights. Thus, in the future, judges in the United
Kingdom might feel, after getting accustomed to their new role, freer
to assume an active role in the protection of human rights than their
counterparts in pure judicial review systems.235  Upholding
Parliament's supremacy might help the British courts to overcome
their reluctance to participate in the civil liberties arena and to
exercise intensively their interpretative and declarative powers over
primary legislation.236
231. See generally supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (providing the
example of judicial review in the United States).
232. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text (explaining that Parliament
is under no legal obligation to conform its laws to a court's ruling of
"incompatibility").
233. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (asserting that the probable
effect of a court's declaration of incompatibility would be a Parliamentary
amending of the offending law).
234. See Lairg, Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 16-17. Lairg notes that,
By such interpretative means the judiciary has been able to confer a high
degree of protection on a range of fundamental norms, such as access to
justice, judicial review, and rights of due process. Consequently, although
British courts cannot strike down legislation, they can often, by interpretative
means, bring legislation which appears to be inconsistent with fundamental
rights into line with them.
Id.
235. See generally id. (discussing how courts can use their interpretative power
to help protect human rights).
236. See Keir Starmer, How the Judges Have Grappled with Human Rights., Titi
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at Law 7 (reporting that Lord Chancellor emphasized that the
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V. CONCLUSION
It is evident that one cannot achieve an accurate understanding of
the British Human Rights Act's implications without first
appreciating the context of the cultural atmosphere and background
in which it will operate. Indeed, the shift to a rights-based system
under the Act will have far-reaching consequences.23 '
Trust is deeply connected to political legitimacy. Trust in
governmental authorities is an integral part of democratic concepts.
Public trust is a key element in shaping the interrelations between
authorities. In the absence of an ethos or practice of distrust of the
political authorities, a restrained judicial review of government is
expected and even advisable. From our viewpoint, this is the case in
Britain.
The fact that the British judiciary has no legal power to strike
down primary legislation, and in light of the deeply-rooted tradition
of Parliament's supremacy and public trust in Parliament, the
enactment of the Human Rights Act allowed Britain to adopt a
unique model for protecting human rights. This model is anchored in
British culture and would not, therefore, necessarily work well in
other legal systems, such as Canada, Germany, Israel, or the United
States.
The impact of the Human Rights Act on the day-to-day agenda of
the British Parliament may be far greater than its influence on the
judiciary's overall role. Parliament might observe very carefully,
under the influence of the Act, the compatibility of its future primary
legislation. Its preoccupation with its new constitutional task might
be more crucial than the judicial review of the compatibility of
legislation. The fact that the British courts are not empowered to
strike down primary legislation might actually encourage them to
Government should not look on declarations of incompatibility as defeats, but as
opportunities to enhance the protection of rights in the United Kingdom).
237. See Lord Irvine of Lairg, The Development of Human Rights in Britain
Under an Incorporated Convention on Human Rights, 1998 PUBl. L. 221, 224
(arguing that the Human Rights Act is significant because liberty fights become
positive rights guaranteed under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention that the
government may only violate under the specific terms of the convention). At
common law, liberty was a negative right-that is, the only right an individual had
left after all things prohibited by law were taken away. See id.
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issue declarations of incompatibility. The non-pure judicial review
power might make the British courts more robust in exercising their
powers than their counterparts in pure judicial review systems. In
doing so, the courts might contribute to a stronger protection of civil
liberties. In addition, the lack of power to annul legislation might
also diminish some problems of separation of powers and
justiciability that have arisen in countries with pure judicial review.
We have suggested a paradigm, which might be defined as a
Government-Parliament oriented model. It recognizes the undeniable
fact that the enactment of the Human Rights Act heralds a new era in
British constitutionalism. Arguably, Parliament and Government
alike will still be the main players in shaping the boundaries of this
new constitutional age in Britain. The model focuses on the need to
formulate new methods and tools in order for both bodies to fulfill
their responsibilities to act in a way that is compatible with the
Convention rights. It visualizes a special kind of constitutionalism-
a unique British constitutional culture-that combines the best of the
ancient and the new.
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